Introduction
The Annals of Human Genetics was born out of the conviction that understanding the nature of human heredity would make it possible to improve the biological quality of the human population. Launched as the Annals of Eugenics, the journal evolved squarely out of the eugenics movement of the early twentieth century. The journal's founder and first editor, Karl Pearson (1857 Pearson ( -1936 , was the protégé of Francis Galton (1822 Galton ( -1911 , the originator of eugenics as a concept, and the man who coined the term itself (meaning well, or truly, born). While eugenicists were interested in all aspects of human heredity, they were particularly concerned with social and personality traits such as intelligence, "feebemindedness", criminality, alcoholism, pauperism, and mental disorders such as schizophrenia and manic depressive insanity. Most eugenicists believed that such traits were to a large degree, if not exclusively, genetically determined. The perception was widespread that these conditions were increasing at a rapid rate in modern industrial society, and that since "low-grade" individuals with these traits were having more children than "high-grade" individuals, eventually good traits would be swamped by bad and society would deteriorate. The answer, according to eugenicists, was to control reproduction by scientific means in order to increase the number of children born to high-grade, and reduce the number of children born to low-grade individuals and families. To this end Pearson Eugenics, like genetics itself, was an international movement with many variants (Adams, 1990) . Two of the most important movements were those in Britain and the United States. While sharing many characteristics, the two movements differed in various ways, reflecting to some important degree the orientation of their respective leaders: Karl Pearson in Britain and Charles B. Davenport (1866 Davenport ( -1944 Laughlin, (1880 Laughlin, ( -1943 as editor. Like the Annals, Eugenical News published papers on genetics in various organisms alongside papers on human heredity and analysis of family studies and correlations among relatives. Unlike Annals, Eugenical News, published articles on aspects of race, immigration and sterilization, reflecting the more strongly politicized and racialized nature of the eugenics movement in the United States.
Reading through the tables of contents or the pages of either Annals of Eugenics or
Eugenical News today's readers would never realize there was a good deal of potent criticism by scientists and non-scientists a like of many, if not all, of the eugenicists' claims. In one present paper, I will systematically summarize by categore (use of genetics or statistics, general methodology, a range of criticisms brought against eugenics in its own day. This will serve three main purposes: (1) It will make clear that it is not just in hindsight that eugenics claims seem naïve and racially/socially biased from the outset. (2) It will provide a summary, in one place, of the range of criticisms launched against eugenics in its own day. Almost all of the criticisms discussed in this paper have been discussed by historians of eugenics in existing publications. However, to bring all of the objections together in one place will emphasize the extent and quality of the critiques that may not be otherwise apparent. (3) It will help us understand how to approach claims put forward today about a strong genetic basis for complex social traits such as I.Q., criminality, manic depression, sexual orientation, and religiosity (to mention only a few).
I have divided the discussion of criticisms of eugenics into several categories: criticisms of the basic genetic concepts, criticism of eugenicists' methodologies (sampling, data collection, analysis including statistical problems), criticism from a sociological and political perspective, and finally, criticism of the very moral and ethical basis on which eugenical ideas were based.
Opposition to the Scientific (Genetic) Basis of Eugenics

General Criticisms
One of the most generally damning evaluations of eugenic work coming out of Davenport's Eugenics Record Office was that it was carelessly and sloppily conceived and executed, and lacked any semblance of normal scientific rigor. Such wide-ranging criticism appeared early in the history of the movement in 1913 and came from the Galton Laboratory, under Pearson. The particular studies that provoked the criticism were a series of papers on the inheritance of mental defect, or "feeblemindedness" by Davenport (Davenport, 1912a (Davenport, , 1912b (Davenport, , 1912c , and Henry H. Goddard, author of the highly-popularized study of the Kallikak family in New Jersey (Goddard, 1912) . The criticisms came in a series of three papers by David Heron (1913) , Pearson and J.A. Jaederholm (1914) and Pearson (1914) . All three investigators were strong eugenicists in their own rights, and felt that poorly conceived and executed work would "cripple the progress of eugenics" by making it seem slipshod and unscientific (Spencer and Paul, 1998: p. 443) . Indeed, Heron claimed that "those of us who have the highest hopes for the new science of Eugenics in the future are not a little alarmed by many of the recent contributions to the subject which threaten to place Eugenics with the older 'social science' and much modern sociology -entirely outside the pale of true science" (Heron, 1913: p. 4; quoted in Spencer and Paul, 1998: p. 443 ).
Of the three critiques coming from the Galton Laboratory, Heron's was the most bold and forthright in its criticisms. Heron's most general criticism was the lack of critical approach that went into Davenport's and others' work on feeblemindedness. He felt that papers were based on data that "has been collected with a decided bias in favour of a particular theory of heredity [Mendelism] ; 2 that it is presented with extraordinary carelessness; that it is, on internal evidence, repeatedly contradictory; that it is not treated in any adequate statistical manner, and that the conclusions reached are not justified by the data" (Heron, 1913: p. 12 We turn now to more specific categories of criticism of eugenic work in the United States.
Problems in Defining Phenotypes
The most generally pervasive criticism of the genetic basis of eugenics, as exemplified by Davenport's interpretation of feeblemindedness, concerned the tendency to oversimplify. One form of oversimplification lay in the definitions of behavioral or personality phenotypes themselves. What is "feeblemindedness", "criminality" or "manic depressive insanity"? A British writer, K.L. Kenrick claimed as early as 1914 that conditions like "feeblemindedness" are so vague and subjective as to be meaningless (Kenrick, 1914: 72) . T.H. Morgan made much the same point a decade later when he pointed out:
The case most often quoted is feeblemindedness that has been said to be inherited as a Mendelian recessive, but until some more satisfactory definition can be given as to where feeblemindedness begins and ends, and until it has been determined how many and what internal physical defects may produce a general condition of this sort, . . . . it is extravagant to pretend to claim that there is a single Mendelian factor for this condition (Morgan, 1925: 200-201) .
The same can be said for "intelligence" or "insanity". Morgan pointed out that intelligence is not a single entity, but that there are many kinds of intelligences:
The main difficulty is one of definition. It is commonly assumed that there is one, and only one, criterion of intelligence --that we are speaking always of the same thing when we use the word. . . In reality our ideas are very vague on the subject. Accurate work in heredity can only be attained when the diagnosis of the elements of a situation is known (Morgan, 1932: 207-210 ).
Morgan went on to say that
The inheritance of derangements of the mental faculties of man is a very difficult problem, partly because there are few, if any, parallels in other animals that can be experimentally tested, partly because the diagnosis in man is often uncertain, and partly because the environment is a complicating agency . . .
(ibid).
It is important to note here that Morgan emphasized that the preconditions for accurate work in genetics is a clear definition of the phenotypes being investigated. A similar variation of this argument is that voiced by social psychologist J.B. Eggen, who pointed out that terms like "feeblemindedness" or "insanity" covers a multitude of specific components and are not a single entity:
The term [insanity] designates a wide variety of functional disorders, and not by the widest stretching of the imagination can they all be grouped together and considered as an entity. . . [mathematical ability, musical ability, immorality, alcoholism] are not single definite things, which can be inherited as a unit. They are complex and variable factors, not one of which can ever be thought of as a unit or entity (Eggen, 1926: 885 (Myerson et al, 1936: 88) . The authors go on to name Davenport and the Cold Spring Harbor investigators in particular, as having done work that was so vague and sloppy as to be worthless.
It is not necessary to multiply examples endlessly to underscore the fact that many critics found the very first step in a genetic study --precise definition of phenotype --seriously wanting in much eugenic research.
Oversimplification of Genetic Models: The Unit-Character Concept
Equally problematic was the tendency, especially of the American school to postulate simple Mendelian factors to explain complex behaviors --i.e., they worked under the unit-character concept of early Mendelism (Ludmerer, 1972: 62; Morgan, 1932; Jennings, 1927) . The unit-character concept is based on the assumption of a oneto-one relationship between a phenotypic character and a Mendelian gene. Thus, there is a gene for eye color, another for stature, and yet another for feeblemindedness. Herbert
Spencer Jennings (1868 Jennings ( -1947 , a Zoologist & protozoan geneticist at Johns Hopkins University, was particularly critical of this concept by the late 1920s, arguing that most knowledgeable geneticists had rejected it 10-15 years previously:
". . . from the fact that the 'unit characters' changed when a single gene changed, it was concluded that in some ill-defined way, each characteristic was 'represented' or in some way condensed and contained, in one particular gene. . . There is indeed no such thing as a 'unit character', and it would be a step in advance if that expression should disappear. . . . The doctrine is dead." (Jennings, 1924: 237) Similarly, Myerson et al state that "There is now on record a considerable body of evidence to show that often a few and sometimes many genes in the residual hereditary background of an individual affect the expression of a single gene being studied. . . .[In terms of fluctuating characters] there is little doubt but that this fluctuation is due to modifying factors in the residual heredity of the individual . . . " (Myerson et al, 1936: 73-74) .
That Davenport could, as late in the development of Mendelian genetics as 1919, publish an account of thalassophilia (love of the sea) as a Mendelian, sex-linked recessive found in the families of naval officers only underscores the height of oversimplification embodied in the unit-character concept still rampant in American eugenical thinking.
Oversimplification of Genetic Models: Gene-Environment Interactions
Moving beyond the gene, the problems of definition are only compounded at the Davenport's reliance on so much subjective evaluation of cases by their fieldworkers (Allen, 1986: 251) . The second report was more direct and scathing:
"The records, upon which so much effort and money have been expended, have to date been extremely little used, to judge by the number of publications based upon them. Thus the Office [Eugenics Record Office] appears to be accumulating large amounts of material, and devoting a disproportionately great amount of time and money to a futile system for indexing it, without certainty, or even good probability, that it will ever be of value." (quoted in Allen, 1986: 251 from a genetic point of view; for it is obvious that these groups of individuals have lived under demoralizing social conditions that might swamp a family of average persons. It is not surprising that, once begun from whatever cause, the effects may be to a large extent communicated rather than inherited." (Morgan, 1925: 201-202) .
Given that Davenport himself had published detailed family pedigrees showing "inheritance" of pellagra (a niacin, or vitamin B 1 deficiency) in 1916 only makes
Morgan's point more obvious (Davenport, 1916) . As Morgan pointed out, families share social practices, including diets, as well as genes.
It was obvious that pedigrees do not separate genetic from environmental effects, and eugenicists themselves were well aware of the problem. Early on, A.M. CarrSaunders in Britain, in an exhaustive critique of much eugenics work up to 1914, pointed out that in their zeal to show biological heredity many eugenicists overlooked the role of environment (Carr-Saunders, 1914) . As a neo-Lamarckian, Carr-Saunders observed that it was theoretically impossible to ever separate rigorously the effects of heredity from those of environment in any individual case. In addition, by such zealous emphasis on heredity eugenicists were showing an insensitivity to the value of changing social practices in improving the lot of their fellow human beings. Major Leonard Darwin (Charles Darwin's son) sounded the call for eugenicists not to give the appearance of ignoring all social or educational reform, lest they lose all credibility:
"What I am desirous of suggesting on this occasion is that the keenest advocates of eugenics are in danger of urging their views in such a way as to produce false impressions; for by perpetually harping on the vastly greater importance of heredity as compared with environment, a false belief may, and I think, at times has been created that they are careless concerning many reforms intended to improve the lot of human beings by improving human surroundings." [And, quoting from Galton, he continues, eugenicists must] "state from time to time in the most definite manner possible that we do not deny the great influence of environment, and that we 'acknowledge freely the great power of education and social influences in developing the active powers of the mind'." (Darwin, 1916: 93-94) .
To Leonard Darwin and the more thoughtful eugenicists, heredity and environment worked together and all social programs should be grounded in that realization.
In the inter-war period, gene-environment interaction became an increasingly prominent theme among critics of eugenics in the United States. T.H. Morgan was one who repeatedly echoed this sentiment. Although a leader in the development of the atomistic gene concept, Morgan was always an embryologist at heart, and recognized the importance of environmental input into the development of any phenotype. After reviewing the "best case" evidence for the inheritance of mental traits (e.g., Huntington's chorea, considered a form of degenerative insanity at the time) Morgan pointed out the grave difficulty in trying to separate genetic from environmental influences in human beings:
"If these 'best cases' are so far from being established on a scientific footing, it is not particularly profitable to discuss the many claims that have been set up for other mental traits . . . The important point, however, to be urged is that the 'mental traits' in man are those that are most often the product of the environment which obscures to a large extent their inheritance, or at least makes very difficult their study." (Morgan, 1925: 203) .
With regard to even more vague characteristics such as "intelligence," Morgan was doubly skeptical:
"The difficulty, of course, is --aside from our inability to define what is meant by intelligence --that we do not know here how much is due to nature and how much to nurture." (Morgan, 1932: 209) and which ones are not. "Unfortunately," he wrote, "this has not been the method pursued,"
the battle-cry of the eugenists, 'Nature not nurture,' has been raised to the rank of a dogma, and the environmental conditions that make and unmake man, physically and mentally, have been relegated to the background." (F. Boas, "Eugenics," Scientific Monthly 3 (1916): 471-478).
Eugenicists, Boas complained, simply assumed that most traits were inherited (which was, of course, the point to be proven in the first place) and then proceeded to argue about what the pattern of inheritance was.
Physiological chemist Oscar Riddle (1877 Riddle ( -1968 , who had carried out much work on endocrine function, particularly the role played by hormones in growth and development, 3 was sensitive to the apparent disregard most eugenicists had for the role of the environment in the development of human mental and behavioral traits. In his view, genes were not rigid determiners, but their output, whatever it was, could be significantly influenced by external factors:
"It has become clear that the specific conditions under which a gene or factor operates and develops have an equal value with the germinal factors in the appearance of anything that can be called heredity." (Riddle, 1928: 62-71 ).
Riddle would have agreed with modern statements to the effect that there can be no gene expression without an environment in which that expression takes place, and in which the gene's expression is not affected in some way by that environment.
Meanwhile, in their lengthy critique of eugenics from a neurological perspective, (1) the whole (an organism, for example) is greater than the sum of its parts, and that (2) (Jennings, 1924: 232-233) Jennings went on to say that "what the body as a whole shall become -depends not alone on what it contains -its heredity -but also its relation to many other conditions; on its environment." (Ibid, (230) (231) . Proceeding on an anti-reductionist, developmentallyoriented line of reasoning, Jennings had occasion to point out that genes were not destiny:
"The characteristics of the adult are no more present in the germ cells than are those of an automobile in the metallic ores out of which it is ultimately manufactured." (Jennings, 1925; quoted in Myerson et al, 1936: 77) .
Jennings had an appreciation for the process of embryonic development, akin to the process of manufacturing a car. In development, all genes acted against a background of other genes plus input from the environment. The blueprint for a car or the genes for an organism only materialize in the context of materials supplied from the outside, and the nature of these can affect in critical ways, the overall outcome (structure of the car or phenotype of the organism). No matter how precise the blueprints (genetic elements inherited from the parents) the ultimate and detailed form of the product (the offspring's phenotype) was always strongly influenced by environmental inputs.
It is important to point out that most eugenicists claimed they realized that environmental factors played a role in determining phenotypes, especially for human personality and social traits. In his article, "Crime, Heredity and Environment" in 1928, for example, Davenport acknowledged that what is considered criminal varies from culture to culture: "Crime is always a relative thing, having relation to the mores or to the behavior that is expected of one. In one country bigamy is a crime; in another it is the conventional mode of life." (Davenport, 1928: p. 307 , an Italian psychiatrist and founder of the field of "criminal anthropology" in the 1890s, argued that criminals are a degenerate sub-set or "race" of the human species characterized by visible, atavistic features (what he called "stigmata") that allowed detection of the criminal, with correlations even between particular stigmata and particular types of crime. Although Lombroso's claims were largely rejected by the 1920s, he is credited with shifting criminology from a purely legalistic to a more scientific, some have said more "humane" approach. Davenport did not accept Lombroso's findings but did appreciate his attempt to understand criminals as "born" rather than made.
A number of critics picked up on eugenicists' poor design of studies, circular reasoning, poor use of statistics, and a tendency to draw sweeping conclusions that went far beyond what the available data allowed.
In the process of data-gathering, a number of critics noted that eugenicists gathered largely anecdotal evidence, by self-administered questionnaires or other means whose uniformity or accuracy could not be verified (Heron, 1913; Morgan, 1925; Jennings, 1924) . Laughlin sent out hundreds of eugenical questionnaires to college students asking about family backgrounds, conditions known to exist in their families, and the like -data that was wholly dependent on the recipient's reliability, accuracy and ability to gain information about family members. In an era before the routine preparation of medical records, much of the information on which family studies were made was gained by hearsay and guesswork. Even the trained field workers from the Eugenics Record Office often had to accept family and community rumors (i.e., gossip), or make their own subjective assessments of the family members they met. And of James Dack, whom she did meet:
"James Dack was commonly known as 'Rotten Jimmy', the epithet was given because of the diseased condition of his legs, which were covered with chronic ulcers, although the term is said to have been equally applicable to his moral nature. He was a thief and a general good-fornothing, but neither shrewd nor cunning. His conversation quickly revealed his child-like mind." (Finlayson, 1916: pp 6-7) .
On the basis of such information family pedigree charts such as the one for the Dacks shown in Figure 1 , were constructed and genetic hypotheses proposed to explain the individuals' phenotypes in Mendelian terms.
There were also problems of sampling error that greatly skewed results (usually in favor of eugenicists' arguments). One example will suffice, again from the ERO. To Laughlin's data and conclusions were analyzed and strongly criticized by Joseph
Gilman, a Professor in the School of Business Administration at the University of Pittsburgh (Gilman, 1924) . Gilman noted that Laughlin had not corrected his sample for age or sex, especially important for comparisons since incarcerated populations tend to be largely male, between the ages of 20-30, while the general population includes both males and females and all ages (Gilman, 1924) . It was also well known, Gilman pointed out, that immigrant populations tend to include more males, since men come first to find work and establish themselves before bringing over their families. For the year 1916,
Gilman noted, the number of inmates in state and federal prisons contained twelve times more men than women, yet only if the number of males in the general immigrant population were also twelve times greater, would the difference between immigrant and non-immigrant groups be significant (Gilman, 1924: p. 40 (Laughlin, 1923: pp. 828-830) . Among the other factors that skewed Laughlin's results, Gilman noted, was that the response rate of prison authorities to Laughlin's questionnaire was much higher from the northeast than from any other part of the country. Since immigrants from Europe were more concentrated in the northeast, the prison numbers reflected the prison populations in that geographic area, while the census, of course, reflected the population of the country as a whole. Laughlin had either not noticed the geographically skewed returns, or had decided not to comment on them (Allen, 2001 ).
Another methodological issue is the failure of eugenicists to consider seriously, and test, alternative explanations for the causes of mental and social behaviors. Although not a biologist, journalist and essayist Walter Lippmann (1889 Lippmann ( -1974 Brigham's conclusion, with which Yerkes agreed, was that the quality of immigrants had been declining for at least several decades (Brigham, 1923: pp. 110-111) . However, Lippmann found that a far more compelling correlation existed between scores on the tests and number of years of schooling (Lippmann, 1923: 97) . Further, arranging group scores by region of the U.S., and by availability of schools (per capita) in these regions, yielded another more significant correlation. Could not education, Lippmann asked, account for a large amount of higher scores compared to lower scores on the tests?
Lippmann was sophisticated enough to realize that correlations do not prove causality, but his point was that the psychologists such as Brigham, who were also staunch eugenicists, had not bothered to make such comparisons themselves. They simply proved what they started out believing.
There were also problems with the use or misuse of statistics. In Laughlin's crime data presented to Congress, for example, Joseph Gilman noted that while Laughlin reported the standard error (SE) for his calculations of percent incarcerated, he made no use of the data in his analysis, a particularly glaring omission when the SE was large. On a similar note, in the study on race-crossing in Jamaica Davenport and Morris Steggerda,
made much of what they claimed to be the greater variability of traits in "browns", that is offspring of one white and one black parent, than in offspring of white parents or black parents. In making this argument Davenport presented variability as standard deviation of 52 physical traits that Steggerda had measured in Jamaica. But physical anthropologist
Wilson D. Wallis argued that Davenport should have used the coefficient of variation
(standard deviation divided by the mean of each population), since the populations under consideration (whites, blacks and browns) all had different means for the traits that were examined (Wallis, 1938: p. 686, 690, 692 ; see also Altink, 2006: pp. 69-70) . As Wallis pointed out, using standard deviation alone did appear to support the claim of greater variability among hybrids, but when coefficient of variation was calculated, all but a few traits (nasal breadth, for example) showed less variability in browns than in either blacks or whites (Ibid: p. 692, and Table 7 ). The generalization that hybrids between two populations always show greater variability seemed to Wallis to be, at best, a moot point; at worst, it was simply untrue. It was apparent that Davenport used the statistic that would give him the results he wanted, since he had argued that race-crossing was "disharmonious" and that greater variability meant greater disharmonies (Davenport, 1928 (Davenport, , 1929 .
Practical Problems of Eugenics
A number of criticisms of eugenics touched on the practical problem of achieving eugenic goals even if those goals seemed desirable. Among the problems were of course the social, ethical and legal issues surrounding methods like compulsory (or even voluntary) sterilization. But from the biological and genetic perspective, there were problems, too. One was that if most pathological conditions were truly recessive, it would take generations to truly eradicate them from the population. Especially after the rise of population genetics, it was realized that earlier hopes of quick solutions to social problems through eugenic measures were naïve and unrealistic (Kevles, 1985) .
On the other side of the coin, critics such as T.H. Morgan pointed out that social reforms would be a far more quick and effective way to deal with many of the problems eugenicists wanted to solve through genetics. As he wrote in 1925:
"Social reforms might, perhaps, more quickly and efficiently get at the root of a part of the trouble, and until we know how much the environment is responsible for, I am inclined to think that the student of human heredity will do well to recommend more enlightenment on the social causes of deficiencies rather than more elimination in the present deplorable state of our ignorance as to he causes of mental differences." (Morgan, 1925: 205) Morgan later (1932) compared the basic method of dealing w/ mental defects to that with communicable diseases: In the past we could have bred for greater resistance to cholera or TB, but it was quicker and more satisfactory to clean up the environment and thereby eliminate the pest, than to change the human constitution (Morgan, 1932: 210-211) . He concludes with a strong humanitarian plea:
"If within each human social group the geneticist finds it impossible to discover, with any reasonable certainty, the genetic basis of behavior, the problems must seem extraordinarily difficult when groups are contrasted with each other where the differences are obviously connected not only with material advantages and disadvantages resulting from location, climate, soil and mineral wealth, but with traditions, customs, religious, taboos, conventions, and prejudices. A little goodwill might seem more fitting in treating these complicated questions that the attitude adopted by some of the modern race-propagandists." (Morgan, 1925: 207) .
The gist of Morgan's argument was that even if genetic factors might be involved in leading to certain social or mental conditions, it would make far more sense to search out the social components involved, since those could be changed more readily. It would not require multiple generations to provide better schools, clean up ghettos and improve living conditions (including public health measures), and these would inevitably have an ameliorating effect for everyone.
A considerable number of critiques of specific eugenics social programsimmigration restriction and the various proposals for compulsory sterilization -were advanced as those campaigns became prominent in the public arena. I will not discuss here the many objections to eugenics on moral, ethical, legal and religious grounds, as those have been discussed by others would take us too far afield from the topic of the present paper. This is not in any way to diminish the importance, indeed, the centrality of such arguments in the larger picture of the history of eugenics. They were certainly part of the discussion in their own day. But they all raise questions which would require a lengthier discussion that is possible here. Society, and later President of the Pioneer Fund, certainly took to heart the criticism of blatant racism and jingoism and tried to steer the eugenics movement in a slightly different direction, away from the kind of work done at Cold Spring Harbor. It is not likely that the scientific criticism had a major impact on the educated public in general. In fact, eugenic ideas were still being included in high school biology textbooks well into the 1940s and 1950s (Selden, 1999) .
In Association )the grounds that it was claiming more than it could scientifically justify) but he did so privately in a letter to Davenport (Allen, 1978: pp. 228-229) . Others who had doubts also expressed them in private correspondence but did not make their views public. In this way the general public clearly got the impression that eugenics had the stamp of approval of the scientific/genetics community, especially given that the field was promoted by leading geneticists such as Davenport, and had gained a fair amount of exposure in the popular media.
From this history I think two important conclusions emerge. The first is that it is important for knowledgeable geneticists to examine claims abut the inheritance of this or that trait (especially complex behavioral, personality and mental traits) when they are think the lesson from the history of eugenics is that those with the background and expertise to expose the fallacies in oversimplified genetic explanations should do so, as should we all try to bring our technical skills to a broader reading public. It is one of the most important ways in which we can insure that the misuse of our science does not occur again.
Figure 1
Pedigree of the Dack Family of Rural Pennsylvania (Finlayson, 1916) 
